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At the beginning of the nineteenth century the American
economy, similar to that of all other Western nations, was essentially
agrarian. A good deal of farm work was associated with and dependent
upon agriculture. Crafts and trades were dominated by guild«like
organisations. The rest of the working force was limited to day
labor or mill work available In the Infant Industries.
The early mills and factories with their small windows and
lack of sanitary conditions were unhealthy places In which to work.
Legislation to protect the welfa3re of the workers did not exist.
Everywhere the worker was entirely dependent upon the will of the
employer. As tlw nation's economy expanded the wage earners became
Increasingly dissatisfied with their lot and began to search for ef-
fectlve means of bettezdng their conditions of employment. They began
to organize*^
The earliest labor organization In America took a form known as
the craft local union. The unions were limited In scope and restricted
to specific trades In specific localities. Their purpose was the
^Herle Falnsod, Lincoln Gordon and Joseph C. Palamountaln, Jr.,
Government and the American Economy (3rd.ed.} New lork: N. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1959}* pp.U’*^*
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protection of the interests of their nembers* These interests
included wages, hours and conditions of work as well as the care of
the indigent members* In a sense the/ were benevolent societies*
The/ provided benefit payments for insiirances, illnesses, funerals
and burials* As the intensit/ of the economic struggle with the em-
plo/ers increased, these benevolent features, although retained in
most of the unimis, became secondai/ to collective bargaining*^
By 1820, the growth of industzy, the Influx of people moving
to the cities and the development of transportation facilities had
progressed sufficient!/ to enable local unions of various crafts to
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unite in cit/ associations and to organize national craft unions*
The factor/ s/stem appeared at a tine when both farmers and independent
journe/men found the demands of labor were increasing!/ harder.
The first public manifestations of organized labor actuall/
occunred in western Massachusetts. Farming and sheep-raising had been
marginal activities, and the rising prices with the loss of labor to
the mills were evident* There was a spontaneous formation of working¬
men's groups with platforms revolving around the issues of status, free
from class appeals or disagreements concerning the econom/*
During 1830, in eastern Massachusetts, small mechanics and workers
with feelings over their role in an industralized future, began to form
^E* E* Cummins, Bie Labor Problems in the United States (New
York! D* Van Nostrand Compan/, Inc*, 19^^), pp* i63-6U*
^Florence Peterson, American Labor Union (New Yorkt Harper and
Row Publishers, 1963), p. U5«
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urban chapters of the Workingmen's Party*^ In sharing the Interests
and objectives of the middle elassi the Workingmen drev their support
from the broad stratum of society ranging from wage earners to the
professions*
Jacksonian Democracy gave encouragement to organised labor In
the period between 1830 and 18U8* By 1850) the slavery controversy
had overshadowed all other social and economic Issues In the country*
Thus, on the eve of the Civil War, organised labor activity In the
United States went Into an eclipse*^
It was the Union's victory In the Civil War that provided, among
other things, the necessary Incentive for labor to organise on a
national scale* The victory provided a tremendous stimulus to Industry;
It brought to the national leadership the Republican Party which largely
represented the economic Interests of Northern Industry* The defeat
of the South meant the end of strong agrarian opposition to such business
objectives as the high protective tariff and other measures such as
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grants of land to promote the expansion of railroads*
In 1866, the National Labor Union was established and William
H* Sylvls was made president* The National Labor Union sought to
provide the basis for a national craft union organization* In 1872
It became a political party and when Its presidential candidate withdrew,
^Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Bostons Little,
Brown and Company, 19ls6), pp* 1U8-U9*
^Walter Huglns, Jacksonian Democracy and the Woriclng Class
(Stanfords Stanford University Press, I960), pp* 11*12*




In 1869| Uriah S. Stevens, a Philadelphia garment maker, along
with several fellow workers, organized the Noble Order of the Knights
of Labor. This was a semi-secret organization. It attempted to
organize men and women of every craft, creed and color. It included
both skilled and unskilled workers.^ The main principle on which the
Knights stood was cooperationt a cooperation of various crafts for the
purpose of securing higher wages and better working conditions for
themselves. The Knights accepted everyone for membership except
lawyers, bankers, stockholders and professional gairiblers.^
The wide use of machinery and the numerous divisions of labor
threatened the economic position of a number of the crafts. Further
complicating the problem was the large number of immigrant workers who
were willing to work for extremely low wages. Many of tJie immigrants
were imported by employers' associations or large corporations seeking
cheap labor, and, in some cases, they were used as strikebreakers.
The craft unions sought nationwide organization to distinguish them¬
selves from the unskilled and semiskilled workers and to protect the
standards of their trade.
Another factor that promoted national unions was the traveling
^Arthur D. Butler, Labor Economics and Institutions (New lorki
Macmillan Company, 1963), pp» Ii7-)*8.
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Frank T. Carlton, !^e History md Problems of Organised Labor
(New YorkI D. C. Heath and Company, 1920), p. 72.
3Arthur J. Goldberg, AF^CIO Labor United (New Yorki McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1956), p. 19*
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Journeymen. These working people were searching for the high wage
paying cities. Some control was necessary to keep them from leaving
the smaller cities for the larger ones. This would have to be done
through uniform rules and administered in a manner by which all locals
were dealt with.^
V/hen Samuel Gompcrs became president of the American Federation
of Labor, the Knights of Labor had already passed the heighth of their
power and influence but remained an important factor in the labor move¬
ment for the next ten years. At the AFL convention in 1666, Gompers
accused the Knights of Labor Executive Board of selling out the interests
of the workers. lAien Gompers looked back on the strikes that had taken
place, he felt that the Executive Board had consistently agreed to the
demands of the employers. Gompers held many conferences but a plan
of unification could not be drawn up since the delegates were not
empowered to do more than make recommendations.
Later, Gompers was convinced that further attempts to try
to keep the Knights of Labor together was useless* Some of the
representatives declared after the conference that they would not
abide by the resolution but would deal directly with the national and
international trade unions. The Knights of Labor had rapidly declined
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and many segments were going over to the American Federation of Labor.
Industrialisation spurred the local unions' growth of a federa¬
tion. Out of a group of dissatisfied members of the Knights of Labor
arose the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions. The
^Ibid., p. 20.
^Bernard Mandel, Samuel Gompers (Yellow Springs, Ohiot The
Antioch Press, 1963), pp. 78-79.
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Federation celled upon all unions not menibers of the Knights of Labor
to join them for protection against the Knights. The new group ulti-
mately took the name "The American Federation of Labor" and its chief
sponsor was Goners. Gompers was bom in London* the son of a Jewish
cigar maker* Similar to most trade unionists* there was little in
the philosophy of the Knights of Labor that he could accept* He did
not believe in serai-secret organizations or the rituals conducted at
their meetings.^
It was Goii^rs and his close associates who laid down the baslo
philosophy of the American Federation of Labor* They thought the
government should serve as an umpire in labor relations and in the
maintenance of order* but should not interfere in industrial telations
nor the internal affairs of labor or business. Gompers was so exposed
to government Intervention in labor disputes until he was not willing
to accept government facilities and assistance for mediation and
voluntary arbitration^ He thought such intervention might lead to
compulsory arbitration and that government aid would lead to government
control and dictation.^
The AFL was to serve as a clearinghouse for the operation of craft
vniems. It encouraged unorganized skilled and semiskilled workers to
join national trade unions.^
In 190^* however* Gompers stated publicly that the masses of
unskilled labor could not be organized. He blamed this on their lack
^Ibid«* pp* 61-62*
2Gordan F. Bloom and Hert>ert R. Northrup* Economics Labor Rela¬
tions (5th ed*} Homewood*]^*t Richard D. Irvin, Inc** p* 52*
^Samuel Gompers* Seventy Years of Life and Labour(New Yorkt
Augustus Kelly* 196?)* p* 375*
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of Intelligence; he also felt that women should not be wage earners*
The wife as a wage earner was a disadvantage economically and should be
excluded from industrial employn^nt as much as possible* Gompers
supported a union in Massachusetts which forced women out of the core¬
making trade on the grounds that their employment at that woiic was
degrading to. womanhood.^
Booker T. Washington, the Negro spokesman and educator, charged
that the craft unions were hindering the advancement of Negroes by
failing to organize them. Gompers was also criticized by liUliam
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E. B. DuBois for ignoring the protests of Negro workers.
In view of the AFL's position that all skilled workers should
be organized, it faced the necessity of providing a place for black
workers employed in crafts or industries in which unions would not
admit Negroes* Thus, authority was given to the AFL's Executive
Council in 1902 to set up central labor unions, local unions, or
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national labor unions con^osed exclusively of Negro workers*
Gompers finally concluded that although it was better for the
labor movement to organize all workers regardless of race, creed, or
color, it was preferable to organize white and black workers into
separate unions than not to organize them at all*^
^Roy Marshall, The Negro and Organized Labor (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965p* 20*
^Ibid., p* 21*
3Phillp Taft, Organized Labor in American History (New York:
Harper and Row, 1961*), p. 669*
^Marshall, op«cit*, p*21*
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century the courts had
recogniaed the right of labor to organize unions. The most effective
weapon which management was able to utilize to restrain actions by
the unions was the injunction.^ The second most effective device was
the yellow-dog contract. This was an agreement between enqployers and
the workers by which the employees agreed to not Join an independent
union. The workers co\ild agree to Join a company union; they could
agree to not go out on strike; they couid agree to not engage in
agitation for a union; they could even agree to not read union litera*
ture. The employees were able to keep their Jobs and the agreement
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was to last for the duration of their employment.
Big business was to rely very heavily upon the injunction, the
yellow-dog contract and even violence to combat the great national
strikes that began to plague the country after 1890.
In 1892, at Homestead, Pennsylvania, the workers of the Carnegie
Stedl Company, members of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel
and Tin Workers refused to accept new wage cuts.'^ The company's
general manager, who was the tough-minded, stubbornly anti-labor, Henry
Clay Frick, suddenly closed down the entire plant and refused any
further negotiations with the union. Frick had hired special deputy
sheriffs to guard company property in addition to three hundred Pinkerton
detectives to be located on barges in the Ohio River. The strikers set
^George W. Taylor, Government Regulation of Industrial Relations
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., l9U8), p. ^9^*
O
‘Emanuel Stein, Labor Problems in America (New Yorki Farrar-
Rlnehart, Inc., 19li0), pp. 5l^-16.
^Leon Wolff, Lockout (New Yorkt Harper and Row Publishers, 1965}»
pp. 26-29•
9
up a small firing line behind several railroad ties. When the strikers
fired at the Pinkerton detectives, but failed to sink the barge, they
poured oil In the river and set It afire. The Pinkertons surrendered
and came ashore.' A few days later, the state militia placed eight
thousand strong men to guard the city. The plant was reopened with
militia protection and non-union men were given the Amalgamated members'
Jobs. The strike was finally broken.^
Following the panic of 1893, there occurred the Pullman strike
In Pullman, Illinois, which was one of the most costly and complex
labor struggles In the country's history. In June, l89li, employees
of the Pullman Palace Car Company struck In protest against a 25 to
UO percent cut In wage and living conditions In their company-dominated
town. Earlier these workers had Joined the American Railway Union, an
Industrial union of railroad workers that had been organised by Eugene
Debs. Becoming dissatisfied with the timidity and caution of the
Railroad Brotherhood, Debs ordered a boycott against all Pullman cars.
The s trike Interfered with transportation of the United States
mall and Interstate commerce. Federal attorneys obtained a court
Injunction restraining the strikes from obstructing the railways.
On July U, a regiment of troops were dispatched to every point In the
state where the authorities called for them. The federal troops were
called to break the strike, not to preserve order. Debs and other
strike leaders were ultimately sentenced to prison for violating the
Injunctions. The Pullman strike was the first major Industrial dispute
^Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor In America (wrd ed.; New Yorkt Thomas
T. Crowell Con^iany, 1966), pp. 166-67.
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In which organised labor felt the full power of the courts* Efforts
to limit the use of injunctions in labor disputes were finally success¬
ful when Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act,
March 23, 1932.1
The Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act was enacted by a
Democratie-controUed House of Representatives and a Republican Senate*
The two B»n initiating the act wez^ Congressman Fiorello Henry
LaGuardia, liberal Republican from New York, and Republican Senator
o
George VAUiam Morris of Nebraska* The Act of 1932 restricted the
power of the federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes
and also put an end to yellow-dog contracts by declarii^ that they
3
were enforceable in the federal coxirts*
^bid*, pp* 173, 179, 197*
^Leon Witmack, Nonris-LaGuydia Act, 1932 (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey! Prentice-Hall, Inc*, 196^), p. 115*
3lbld*, p* 116*
CHAPTER II
LABOR UNDER THE NEW DEAL
The National Industrial Recovery Act
When Franklin D. Roosevelt went into office on March 1933>
his stirring Inaugural address held out a promise of action to cope
vlth the national emergenc/* His address created a feeling of hope and
confidence throughout the nation* The primary task was to put people
to work* The appearance of the New Deal aided In the growth of the
labor movement* Greater gains were to be won by wage earners than In
any previous period In history*
The National Industrial Recovery Act» June 16, 1933, was the
first of many of the New Deal enactments designed to lift the nation
out of the deiaresslon*^ In providing for codes of fair competition,
the act stipulated that approval of any code required compliance with
Section 7(a) of the act* It stated!
(1) That employees shall have the right to organize
and bargain ccdlectlvely through representatives of their
own choosing, and shall be free from the Interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, of their
agents. In the designation of such representatives or In
self•organization or In other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection}
(2) That no en;}loyee and no one seeking employment shall
be required as a condition of employment to join any company
^Stephen J. Mueller and A. Howard Myers, Labor Law and Legisla¬
tion (3rd ed*i Chicago! South-Western Publishing Co*, 1952)',' p* 3^97
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union or to refrain frra joining organizing or assisting a
labor organization*
The National Industrial Reeovexy Act was enthusiastically
accepted by labor, industry and consumer during its two years of life
but the United States Supreme Court was of a different mind. It
declared the act unconstitutional in 193$ because it atteiq>ted to
regulate hours and wages of workers in intrastate business, an invalid
exercise of federal power. The labor provision. Section 7(s) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act was vital to the New Deal* So the
Damooratie Congress in 1935 hastened to preserve that provision in a
new national labor law*
National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act was introduced in Congress by
Senator Robert F* Wagner of New Xork*^ President Roosevelt signed
the act on July 1935, with hopes that the act would give labor
sufficient strength to recover from the effects of the depression and
lessen the causes of labor disputes buzxlening and obstructing inter-
state and foreign conanerce. The act went beyond Section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act in its effort to provide effective
protection for the rights of labor*
In approving the act on July 5, 1935* the President declaredt
A better relationship between labor and management is high
purpose of this Act, end peace in labor relations is and must
^Ibid.j p. 330*
2lrving Berstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy
(Berkeley! University of California Press, 1950), p. 127»
^"National Labor Relations Act, 19U7," Monthly Labor Review, XCI
(August, 1935), 367*
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be the objective of nanagement and labor alike if there
is to be any return of business and prosperity. It is
highly in^ortant that not only management and labor* the
active partner in this most delicate and explosive human
relationship* but the public as well* should know and
understand the meaning of the law and its working*^
In the act* Congress declared as followsi
En^loyers shall have the right to self organisation*
form, join or assist labor organisation through choosing*
and to engage in concerted activities* for the puz^iose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection*
It further stated that it was unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with employees in guaranteeing their rights as
it was mentioned in Section 7* It was also unfair practice for em¬
ployers to control or interfere with the ox^anising of any labor
organisation or contribute financially or any other support to it*
The act was also designed to prevent employers from refusing to employ
or discharge any person for a job or presently employed %forker because
of his membership in any union or if he expressed a desire to join
one*^ In other words* the Whgner Act intended to establish collective
bargaining for employees as soon as possible*^
Several unfair labor practices were defined in the act* Organised
labor numbered only four million members* mostly concentrated in the
construction trades* transportation* mining and needle trades* In
^Thomas H. Slusser* A Practical View of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act and Its Administration (Chicago! The Cuneo Press* Ino*«
p. 98*
^Charles 0* Gregozy* Labor and the Law (2nd ed*j New Yorkt
W* ¥. Norton and Company* Inc** 1961)* pp* 230**31*
^Max S* Vortman* Jr** and C* Wilson Randle* Co3J.ective Bargain¬
ing (2nd ed*{ Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1966;* p. Il3*
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1935« industries such as steel« agricultural tools* petroleun refining*
rubber products* electrical machinery and meat packing had from 50 to
60 percent of their employees covered by company unions*^
Employers were very hostile to unions and used every weapon to
prevent union organization. Lockouts* intimidation* black lists* yellow-
dog contracts* spying and discrimination were very common. The
LaFoUette Committee investigation of industrial espionage reported
that l»i*75 companies were clients of detective agencies during the
years 1933 to 1936. Expenditures on espionage* arms and strikebreaking
in about three hundred companies in 1930-1937 amounted to nearly $9.5
million.^
National Labor Relations Board
The administration of the Wagner Act was placed in the hands of
the National Labor Relations Board. The board was composed of three
members* with the authority to determine the tqppropriate bargaining
unit and to supervise the elections where employees chose their exclu¬
sive representatives for dealing with employers. The board could also
hear con^laints of unfair labor practices and petition the courts for
endorcement of its orders. nie National Labor Relations Board was
not concerned with the disputes over wages and hours* but only the
^H. A. Millis and E. C. Brown* From the fegner Act to Taf^
Hartl^j A Study of National Labor Policy and labor Relations (Chicago*
University of Chicago Press* i^5o)* p. llO.
^LaFoUette Committee Reports* Industrial Espionage* Report No.
1*6* Part 3i 75th Congress* 2d session (Washington* D.C.t U.S. Govern¬
ment Printing Office* November 16* 1937)» pp. 26* 89.
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practical encouragement and facilitation of collective bargaining*^
The Vagner Act has been characterized as the workers' Magna
Carta. Congress had stated that the workers' individual bargaining
was hopeless and ineffective when placed against a giant corporate
enterprise; therefore, a principal objective of the act was to encourage
collective bargaining* It was thought that collective bargaining would
eliminate low wages and poor working conditions* Wages, hours and
other conditions of employment would be established by mutual consent
rather than by the employer's determination* Effective collective
bargaining could develop only when employees had been given the right
to join unions and to engage in specific activities* These rights
o
were enumerated in Section 7*
E3g)ansion of the Power of Organized Labor
Despite widespread opposition and evasion of the labor provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act, that act provided a major stimulus
to organized labor* It was extremely significant to note that the
growth of industrial unions was based on the shop rather than the
craft; that unions included all workers in a factory rather than
separate unions for different types of workers* Many labor leaders
believed that there was a greater strength in one large union than in
separating workers in a factory into different craft unions*^
^Dulles, op* cit*, p* 277*
2
Lois MacDonald, "The National Labor Relations Act," American
Economic Review, XXVI (March, 1936), JA2<-lU*
3Everett Johnson Burtt, Jr*, Labor Markets. Unions, and Govern¬
ment Policies (New Torki St* Martin's Press, 1963)» pp* 96-99•
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of the labor Bovement in
the Nev Deal period was its growth and ttcpansion. The New Deal needed
oz^anized labor to break the grip of the Great Depression. Three nonths
after Booserelt became president, the National Industrial Recovezy Mt
/
passed and set up the National Recovery Act. On the Labor Advisory
Board of the National Recovery Act, the President appointed Jdin L.
Lewis, Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Wozkers of America,
George L. Berry of the Printing Pressmen, snd William Green, president
of The American Federation of Labor.^
The struggle of the nation's factory workers to achieve organiza*
tion occurred mainly between 1935 end 1937 * Meetings were held in
convention halls and council rocxis of the AFL in major industrial cities
such S3 Pittsburgh, Chicago, Gazy, Detroit, Flint, Pontiac, Akron and
others.^
The AFL net in a historic session in Atlantic City in 1935* The
Executive Council had granted an industrial charter to all automobile
workers, with the exceptlcm of those engaged in the manufacturing of
auto parts and in skilled jobs. The Council had established many new
federal local unions in mito parts, gasoline stations, in rubber, alumi¬
num, radio, cement, gas and by-product coke. There were no plans for
granting to the robber wcurkers a real industrial charter. Finally, due
to the internal difficulties within the Amalgamated Associated of Iron,
^Benjamin Stolberg, The Story of the C.I.O. (New Xork* Viking
Press, 1938)* p.l6.
%iltwi Derber and Edwin Young, Labor and the New Deal (Madison,
Wisconsinz University of i^sconsin Press, 1961), p. 10.
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Steel and Tin Workers» the Council did not think it wise to begin an
organising can^aign for unskilled workers in industry.^
However* the division over the craft-industrial issue could no
longer be compromised within the AFL conventions. Conflict broke out
in the open. The resolutions committee gave the majority and minority
reports on the issue. John P. Frey* president of the Met^ Trades
Department* .presented the majority report. It criticised the industrial
union exponents for their apparent disregard of their previous compromise.
Fre)r spoke very strongly that the compromise did not authorize the grant¬
ing of unrestricted industrial union charters in the mass production
industries* all it did was to differentiate between "craftsmen" and
"mass production workers."^
The minority report was presented by Charles P. Howard. nie
main issue of the minority report was that many of the charters that
were craft international unions had been granted at a time when the
skills demanded by mass production industry were unknown. If these
workers were to be successfully organised* there must be a clear under¬
standing that the AFL would recognize the right of those workers to
organize into industirial unions and be granted unrestricted charters
which guaranteed the right to accept into menbershlp all workers em¬
ployed in the industry or establishment without fear of being compelled
to destroy unit of action through recognition of jurisdictional claims
made by national or international unions. the minority group made
^Stolberg* op. cit.. p. 22.
2aoldberg* op. cit.. p. 3U.
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known It had no intentions to deprive the craft international of the
jiirlsdiction which properly belonged to them,^
Lewis> defended the minority report, was so angry that he
became involved in a fist fight on the floor of ths convention with
William S« Hutcherson, president of the United Brothexiiood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America.^ Lewis knew that more than one third of
the convention votes and a large number of the rank and file member-
ship of the AFL unions wanted steel, automobiles, rubber and cement and
textiles organized and if forming industrial unions was the method for
such organizing, he could count on their support. The wozdcers felt
that Lewis was willing to assist them in organizing unions of their
choosing."^
The immediate cause of the split between the AFL and the CIO was
a serious one. There was the conflict of craft with the needs of mass
industry, where craft counted less. At the same time, it is difficult
to say that the split would have taken place if William Green, president
of the AFL, had been a more powerful president.
Because of the urgency of organizing the unorganized in the basic
industries of America, the Committee for Industrial Organization was
formed. It was for the purpose of encouraging and promotii^ organiza¬
tion workers in a mass production end other industries upon an industrial
basis. It aimed to foster recognition and acceptance of collective
llbid., p. 35.
^Louis Stark, "Fist Fight Puts A.F. of L. in Uproar," New York
Times, October 20, 1935* p. 22.
^Berber and Young, op. cit., p. $9*
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bargaining in basic industries and counsel and advise unorganized and
newly organized groups of workers; end to bring them in affiliation
with the American Federation of Labor as industrial organizations*^
Lewis and his fellowmen met innediately after the adjournment
of the convention and began the formation of a Committee for Industrial
Organization* The Committee membership included John L* Lewis as
chairman, Charles P. Howard, secretaiy, and John Brophy as director*
Other members were Sidney Hillman of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
David Dubinsky of the Ladies Garment Workers, Thomas McMahon, president
of the United Textile Workers, Harvey Fremming, president of the Oil
Workers, Max Laritsky, president of the Cap and Millinery W'orkers,
and Thomas H» Brown, president of the International Union of Mine, Mill
2
and Smelter Workers.
The growth of the membership in the CIO was tremendous* Two
years after the organization had started, there were 32 organizations
with a membership of 3,750,000* It had raised wages by $1,000,000,000
a year, cut hours 2,000,000 a week and also improved working conditions*
The CIO had organized 75 percent of the steel industry, 70 percent of
the automobile industry, 65 percent of the rubber industry and about one
third of the maritime and textile industries, and constantly added
organizations in new fields such as public utilities, meat packing, toy
and furniture industries. Thus, the CIO revamped American labor from
^Ibid*. p. 29.
2Committee fear Industrial Organization, Industrial Unionism
(Washington, D*C., 1935)^ p*5*
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craft unions into modem industrial unionism.
The struggle for rights for Negroes had become affected by the
atmosphere of intolerance that stifled the A7L* However, one of the
first or big efforts of the CIO was to smash open the gates of organized
labor for the Negro workers. Many hundreds of thousands of Negro
workers poured into the steel, auto, packinghouse, maritime and other
unions and, as a result, the AFL was forced to liberalize its policy
towards Negroes. The dO also showed some progress in the advancement
of Negroes to leadership in unions by electing them to top offices.
The United Steelworkers had the bulk of the Negro workers in their
O
union, making up about one fifth of the union's membership.
The improvement in the position of Negroes in the labor movement
since 1935 had been the results of several conditions. The CIO unions
had required the practice of anti^exclusion policies for their locals.
The dO unions' policies were based in part on a real desire to eliminate
3
race prejudice.
Women had become a significant segment of the labor force only in
more recent decades. The AFL was a man's organization, composed mostly
of skilled craftsmen. However, the growing mechanization of industrial
processes and the accompanying increases in the competitive employnf^nt
of women led to the use of paid organizers at different times for the
purpose of forming women's locals or bringing them into existing unions
^Ibid.. pp. 28-29.
ZQeorge Morris, Where is the dO Going? (New Tork Cityi New Century
Publishers, March, 19li9), pp. 19-^1.
^Carrol R. Daughtery, The Labor Problems of African Society
(Bostont Houghton Mifflin Company, 1^5^^ pp*
21
of male wage earners. The unionisation of women workers before World
War II came from the CIO, whose unions practiced the principle of In¬
cluding these employees. Unionism was so long taking hold among women
workers because of the attitude of male unionists and policies of
their unions toward female employers.
By the end of 1937i the percentage of organizations in clothing
manufacture had risen considerably. Almost half the workers In the
industry were on payrolls which had less than two hundred and fifty
employees. In 1937, there were about 158,000 wage earners employed
in the industry, of whom slightly more than half were women.
The Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, under the leader¬
ship of Sidney Hillman, was one of the founding unions of t^e CIO and
remained loyal to it until the final merger with the AFL.
The Amalgamated entered the laundry industry with its first
activities in New York City and hearby cities. Host laundry workers
were semiskilled or unskilled and many of them were Negroes, unable
to secxire work in hi^er paying occupations. Wages were very low—
$15.00 a week was thought of as good earnings—and the workers were often
1
obliged to work up to 70 hours a week to achieve that level.
^Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFLi A History of the
American Labor Movement, 1935*19U1 (Cambridge; Harvard University
Frees, 19^(i}, pp* 2b5-bo.
CHAPTER III
POST WDRIi) WAR II STRIKES
Wl^ th« end of World War II, national strikes of larger pra>
portions were called as the unions made efforts to catch up with the
lag in wages resulting from wartime restraints on wage increases*
These postwar strikes demonstrated the power of the new industrial
unions*^ Widespread discontent existed over rising prices and bitter
criticism was directed against Congress for failure to act* The un¬
organized eonsuBffirs had little influence.
In a demand for wage increases adequate to meet the rising prices,
thousands of strikes were called in the last half of 1915 and 19li6.
The year 19li6 turned out to be one of the stormiest in Americui labor
history* There were U*700 strikes involving U,700,000 workers* This
wave of strikes was led b/ sane of the CEO unions in such mass production
industries as automobile manufacturing, electric equipment; meat packing
and steel were generally successful in achieving wage increases. Con-
2
tinned rising prices quickly threw the 19li6 wage scales out of line*
Organised labor also pointed out that it had been the chief
group to oppose ending controls after the war* Wage earners maintained
that the profits of industry were so large that wages could be increased
Goldberg, op* cit*, p* UU*
^Harold Faulkner, American Econo^c History (8th ed*; New York
Harper and Row Publishers, 195U)> p* 718*
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without ralsiog the retail price of the product* la an/ eventf
workers insisted that the/ could protect themselres against inflation
onl/ by higher wages and, if necessaiy, strikes to obtain them. Al¬
though unions had grown in number end in strength during the war and
in their abllit/ to obtain hi^er wages, their position in other wa/s
1
had declined*
The Republican Part/ had won control of Congress in the mid-term
election of 19U6. The AFL and the CIO had supported the Rooseyelt
eandldac/ since 1936, as had the American Labor Part/ and the Liberal
Part/, whose backing came largel/ from labor* It seemed very evident
that the major!t/ of organized workers had thrown in their lot with
the Democrats*
During Vforld War II, the United Automobile Workers pledged to
Uxe government its no-strike polic/ until the end of the fighting.
The workers felt that they were at war and the/ should take the position
that the needs of the countr/ should be met first* Any strike would
weaken the war effort and would la/ the labor movement open to attacks
b/ its enemies* At some of the union's wartime conventions, delegates
gave vent to their discontent but a few people, including the d/namio
leader of the union, Walter Reuther, kept them under control.
After 7-J Da/, President Truman noticed the desires of the workers
for higher wages* He permitted rises in pa/ where the/ would not in¬
crease prices* Two da/s later, Reuther, as director of the General Motors
2U
union's division, wrote to the corporation's president, C. E* Wilson,
asking for 3^^ percent wage increase wii^out price rises. Six weeks
later, the corporation refused to compl/. Reuther began to publicize
the financial reasons for General Motors' ability to pay.
After a month of negotiations between union representatives
and corporation officials, the best offer General Motors would make was
an increase of 10 percent if it could obtain higher prices. The union
rejected the proposal. Reuther called a strike on November 21, which
lasted 113 days. Because of the stand he took for the workers, he
became president of the United Auto Workers.
To gain public favor, Reuther persuaded a group of fourteen
outstanding citizens to study the union's negotiations with General
Motors and make a decision. Their verdict was favorable and was
widely publicized. Finally, on January 10, 19U6, there was a wage
increase of 1^ cents an hour without price increase} Reuther finally
accepted the offer.^
Numerous strikes occurred in the nation because employees
claimed that living costs had continued to rise. In the steel strike
of 19U6, the union demanded that President Truman establish a new wage*
price policy. At the end of the war, the cutbacks of production to
forty hours a week had reduced the take-home pay for thousands of union
members. The union's demand of 25 cents an hour increase was denied
by the company.
The union called upon the National labor Relations Board to t^e
^Madison, op.cit.. pp. 391, 393.
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a strike vote. The workers supported their officers to strike b/ a
▼ote of lAlfUOl to 83,859* The steel strike was set for January 1U>
19U6.
The steel companies were uncertain how they could pay any such
wage Increase as that demanded by the workers and asked for some
assurance of a substantial price Increase from the Office of Price
Administration* The OPA refused to make such a guarantee to the
steel companies*^
President Truman attempted to break this deadlock by proposing
a conqpromlse offer of 18*5 cents an hour* The union accepted and
agreed to postpone strike action until President Benjamin Fairless of
United States Steel had had time to consult with ithe associates of his
own company and tiie other companies that were affected. The Industry
did not accept the offer and the big strike began on January 21, 19U6*
Over 750,000 workers were Involved and only a few plants with
union contracts were able to operate* The usual charges and counter¬
chargers were hurled back and forth, but violence did not occur* At
one plant, there was a problem of mass picketing in which the state
court took a hand, Issuing an Injunction to stop the practice* At
another plant, there was considerable discussion about allowing mainten¬
ance workers In the plant. Finally, the companies agreed that they
would not attempt to operate and the union would not try to keep out
any maintenance men even if they were non-union.^
^Colston E* Warns, ed*. Labor in Postwar America (New lorki
Remsen Press, 19U9)» pp* 388-89*
2lbld., p. 390.
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Meanwhllef the President appointed a fact-finding committee as he
had done for other major disputes, but It soon became erldent that the
lack of any definite vage-prlce policy was as much for the continuation
of the strike as anything else. On January 2U, Fairless said that
government had offered an Increase In the price of steel of over $U
a ton, but this was not sufficient.^ Irving S. Olds, Chairman of
the Board of Directors of the United Steel Corporation, demanded a
price rise of $6.25 a ton. He felt It would be needed to compensate
for the 18.5 cents an hour rise In wages suggested by President Truman.
By February 1^, the union and the corporation had agreed, after the
company was granted a $5 a ton price Increase, to a raise of l8.5 cents
2
an hour.
The coal strike of 19U6 was called a national disaster.
President Truman wanted a showdown with John L. Lewis of the striking
United Klne Workers and the soft-coal operators. There were UOO,OCX)
United Mine Workers who agreed with Lewis to strike, even though It
meant weeks of Idleness and a strain on the pocketbook.
Their leader stood firm on his demand for a health and welfare
fund to be drawn from royalties on mined tonnage and administered
solely by the union. There were other questions Lewis wanted settled
but he thought It best to take them In order of Importance*^
Congressman A. WlUls Robertson from Virginia pushed his bill
^Ibld.
^Taft, op. clt., p. 572.
^Warne, op. clt. p. 372.
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making it illegal for unions to demand the type of royalty sought by
Lewis* Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois termed Lewis as being drunk
with power and urged federal seisure of the mines.
Throughout the couitry* thousands were made idle as industrial
plants began to close down* In prolonging the coal strike, Lewis
played for bigger pay for his miners. The existing wage ceiling of
approximately 18*5 cents an hour above wartime levels was won by the
CIO through its midwinter strikes* Lewis felt if he could win an
increase in pay and royalties which exceeded 18*5 cents, he would
have advanced a long step toward his goal of better protection for
the woricers*^
Public utilities were also dependent on the use of coal and could
not operate until the demand was supplied* When stocks are low,
electric power companies seek to conserve the supply of power for the
most essenticQ. uses*^ The Civilian Production Administration ordered
dimouts for twenty*one states in the fall of the 19U6 strike* Later
the Civilian Production Administration ordered Eastern utilities to
substitute other fuels, interchange power and establish curtailment
programs* During the spring of the 19h6 strike when there was less
than a twenty*eight>day supply of coal for power companies, public
authorities ordered a compulsory dimout for sixty-four Virginia
counties, but only a voluntazy dimout for Philadelphia and New Xork.^
^Iilarno, op* cit*, p* U53*
^Neil Chamberlain, The Impact of Strikes (New York* Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 19li7), p* W*
3lbid*
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Numerous strilces In the United States tended toward the need
for further legislation. Since the passage of the Wagner Act, the
Increase In strikes was due to a number of factors. Unions through
their large Increase In members had become powerful enough to hold out
for their demands. The Increase In the number of workers Increased
the number of potential strikers. Unions learned^ under federal regu¬
lations of wages, that they could tisually win a strike In which the
government controlled the settlement. Issues resulting In strikes
usually Involved wages and working conditions. There were still
some strikes over union representation but not so many as before the
Wagner Act. Organized labor's drive for union security through the
closed shop aid maintenance of n^mbershlp had become an Important
Issue. A number of proposals had been offered. Arbitration of
disputes Involving the public Interest was prqposed. It was also
argued that the Wagner Act should be amended to give employers equal
rights with unions. These and other Issues were discussed In the
80th Congress.^
2
In addition to strikes, labor was plagued by union racketeering.
The methods of racketeering were many, such as terrorism, strikes,
penetration of employers, union organization and bribery.^ Terrorism
keeps the employer In line} It Is also remarkably effective In
l"Strike Recprd," U. S. News, September 27, 19U6, pp. 3l*-35»
2
Carrol R. Daughtery, Labor Problems In American Industry (5th
ed.| Boston) Houghton Mifflin Company, l^lilj, p, iiOli.
3Jack Barbash, The Practice of Unionism (New York) Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1956), p. 567*
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suppressing all but s few daring souls within the union. Terrorism
can take a variety of formsi from personal violence against individuals
to hijacking, sabotage, overturned trucks and murder.^
There are usually two types of labor hpodlums -^first, there is
the putrid person who jtust for the sake of corruption in labor gives his
life to crime in labor. The second typd of labor hoodlum begins as
the first in order to gain access into the labor movement. The reflec*
tion of these actions points to the labor leader who tolerates this
kind of racketeering elements in his union that represents questionable
character. All of the hoodlums in the labor field are sitting watch*
fully to feed upon the well<*meaning workers in labor. A real gangster
cannot enter into any labor movement unless there is a dishonest labor
2leader who permits a dishonest person to come in.
Sane corrupt practices that certain local union officials have
been found to carry on are the padding of expense accounts to amounts
many times their official salaries; the outright embeszlement of union
funds; the selling of supplies or real estate to employers or to their
unions at exhorbitant prices; and taking bribes from employers for sit¬
ting on the lid and holding the rank and file from strikes or other em¬
ployer-disturbing activities. Union grafting is petty compared to
certain extortion practices. These are the real racketeering. Extor¬
tion is likely to exist when an unscrupulous union leader attains a great
3
deal of power through exercising the rights of his office.
^bid.. p. 307.
2qus Tyler, The Ldbor Revolution (New lorki Viking Press, 196?),
pp. 2U3*Uii.
^Daughtery, The Labor Problems of American Society, pp.UoU-05.
CHAPTER IV
BACKGROUND OF THE TAFT-HARTLEI ACT
In 19hlf Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio set out to revise a body
of federal labor laws that had been In effect for twelve years. The
Wagner Act of 193was named for the Democrat from New Yorkf Senator
Robert P. Wagner. This act had been declared by labor leaders as
"Labor's Magna Carta," and it was politically the most significant
single act of Franklin D. Roosevelt's First New Deal. Its basic pur¬
pose was to put the strongest protection about labor's right to bargain
collectively—that is, to soek through unions and unions' actions what
could not be attained by men as individuals.
In the House of Representatives, the Democrats raised the cry
that representatives of employer groups, the National Association of
Manufacturers in particular, had helped to write the House version of
a new anti-labor bill. In charge on the House floor was Representative
Fred A. Hartley, Jr., a Republican from New Jersey.^ Many charges were
made against the bill on the floor of the House, in the press and on the
radio. It was claimed that a major part of the legislation had been
hastily conceived and that insufficient time had been devoted to its
consideration.
nw major portion of the original Hartley bill dealt with wnend-
^William S. White, The Taft Story (New Torki Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 195U), pp. 66, 7^.
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ments to the National Labor Relations Act, since most of the causes
of labor unrest stemmed from that act. It was quite evident that
labor leaders would spare no effort or expense to convince Congress
and the country that the legislation was undesirable and unfair to
labor. Because of this, the House Committee was forced to work out
the details behind closed doors. A certain amount of secrecy was
essential because there were many differences of opinion within the
committee on legal phraseology and on the best methods of tackling
individual problems.^
The Taft-Hartley Act before Congress
The House Committee began to work out a measure that would be
acceptable to the majority of the Republican members of the Committee.
After this was done they considered the measure in a committee and gave
the minority party members an opportunity to present their amendments
in opposition. TlMa the legislation was taken to the Republican caucus
of the House, where further changes were discusssed and some adopted.
The amended legislation was then considered again by the Committee on
Education and Labor. Ihe necessary additional amendments were author¬
ised and the completed bill reported favorably to the House of Repre¬
sentatives
The Hartley bill was designed to outlaw the secondary boycott,
jurisdictional strike, syiqpathetic strike and many other practices.
Another labor practice that Congress had long sought to deal with was
Ipred A. Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy (New Yorki
Funk and Wagnalls Company, 19iiy)» PP* U9-50.
^Ibid.. p. 51.
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mass picketing and riolence. The other major provisions of the
Hartl^ bill iriiich were considered as legislative proposals included
the closed shop ban, the bill of rights for union members, prohibition
of unfair labor practices by vuaion members and the extension of the
anti*trust laws to cover union activities.
The major provisions of the Hartley bill had been supported by
thousands upon thousands of pages of testimony extending back for more
than six years, testimony obtained by congressional committees. The
Hartley bill required three separate roll calls—one was the rule
authorising the debate, another on a motion to recommit and a third
on final passage. The bill passed the House of Representatives on
April 17, 19U7, by a vote of 308 to 107. The Hartley bill had become
The Hartley Act, a change in terminology that indicated approval by
one branch of Congress.^
In the Senate, the control had shifted from Democratic to
Republican. The Republican leaders in the Senate had to watch a close
margin to maintain their leadership. Many of the Senators who were
bitterly opposed to corrective labor legislature in any form had been
in the Senate for several years since they had been last elected.
Senator Taft, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, had selected the members of his committee
so as to have all types of opinions within his party. The Committee
included Republican Senators Ball of Minnesota, Smith of New Jersey,
Donnell of Missouri, and Jenner of Indiana, and one Democrat, ELlender
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of LoiilsianA—all of whom were known to favor corrective legislation
more or less in line with the House approved biU.^
Senators Pepper of Florida and Murray of Montana did not want
any labor legislation at all and did all within their power to prevent
its enactment. Senator Taft was faced with a real problem. He had
drafted a tentative measure for discussion even before his bill had
reached the House Floor.
There were four Importoit provisions to be considered of the
Taft Bill. The first was designed to protect the workers from co>
ercion from any source and would have effectively prevented the further
use of high-handed organising techniques that had become fashionable in
orgaiised labor. A second provision would have restored the principle
of self-government to union leaders and locals in conducting their own
collective bargaining negotiations with the employers directly con¬
cerned. The third provision had established certain rules governing
the administration of welfare and other funds . The last major pro¬
vision eliminated by the Senate Committee from Senator TAft's original
measure would have permitted any injured party to seek relief in the
courts by applying for an injunction against secondary boycotts and
jurisdictional disputes.^
All four had been approved by the Hartley bill. There were
several amendments considered by the Senate. The first amendment was
bitterly opposed by labor's senators because it was designed to protect
^Ibid., pp. 63-6U,
3U
employers from coercion by union organisers. There were other amend¬
ments concerning the problem of Industry-wide bargaining and the ad¬
ministration of the welfare funds. The remainder of the Senate
debate was devoted to a series of delaying actions oh the part of the
opposition and to a detailed consideration of the union shop provisions
of the Taft blU.^
Finally^ the Senate voted In favor of the Taft blll« 68 to 2U.
The principal points In the new Taft-Hartley Act were these t the
closed shop was forbidden] \mlon shop agreements were made lawful only
IT a majority of all employees voted for them by secret ballot; Juris¬
dictional strikes and secondary boycotts were made Illegal) labor
unions ml^t be sued for breach of contract; unfair labor practices fcr
unions as well as employers were defined; In any Industry engaged In
Interstate commerce there must be delay before there could be a lawful
strike; unions were required to make their financial affairs public;
the eighty-day Injunction was provided for In national health-and safety
2
strikes. The Taft-Hartley Act was one piece of leglslatlcn enacted
by the 60th Congress that drained the blood from Truman*8 face.^
President Opposltlqa
President Truman felt that the Taft-Hartley Act was unfair to
the working people of the country and that the act abused the right
^Ibld., pp. 68-69.
2vihlte| op. clt., pp. 76-77.
3Alfred Steinberg) The Life and Times of Harry 3. Truman (New
York) 0. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962}) p. 292.
35
which millions of citizens could enjoy by bargaining with their em¬
ployers for fair Images and fair working conditions* The bill he
thought was deliberately designed to weaken labor unions* Unions
existed so that laboring men could bargain with their employers on a
basis of equalltyi they had Increased the standards of working people
steadily until they had become the highest In the world.
In his rlewj law would weaken unions and undermine the
national policy of collective bargaining} would take bargaining power
away from workers and give more power to management; and would also
expose workers to the abuse of labor Injunctions* Truman placed
emphasis on legislation which would get rid of abuses* Legislation
was not needed that would take fundamental rights away from the working
people *
It was felt by the President that the bill would open up avenues
for many lawsuits Issued by employers against unions, unions against
employers and employers would regret the formation of any such bill*
The bill contained provisions that were not profitable to management*
The provlslms of the act would prevent a union newspaper from
making statements about persons running In a national election* It
was also possible for an Incorporated radio network from spending
money on the national convention of a political party* Considering
these provisions with deep respect, It would be detrimental to free
speech and the free press.
Such legislation,continued Truman, might cause the people of
the United States to divide Into opposing groups. The entire purpose
of the bill was contraxy to the growth of the national labor policy.
36
It was the kind of legislation that vas needed to correct abuses and
to further advances in labor-management relations. The people of
the country should seek to treat all men fairly and Justly^ which
will give people security in the necessities of life.^
In spite of Truman's personal opposition and also his veto,
the Congress of the United States passed the bill.
^Harry S* Truman, Public Papers of *^0 Presidents of the United
States, January 1, 20, December 311 i9U1^ (Washington, D.C.I lil.S. (lovern-*
ment Printing Office, 1963)•
SUMMARY
Man/ pecple felt that government should have shown Its power in
some of the strikes and Imposed compulsory arbitration In the fixing of
vagesy provided the parties could agree* The manner by which the
nationwide strikes were handled was greatly criticised* Nevertheless^
the public felt that the right to strike for hours, wages and working
conditions In the ultimate analysis Is essential to the maintenance
of freedom In the United States*
In trying to deal with labor abuses. Congress endeavored to
collect all possible testimony as to Just what Is wrong In the labor
field* It had tried to correct secondary boycotts and Jurisdictional
strikes*
It was trying to restore the balance back to a point where
management and labor could deal equally with each other and where
they would have approximately equal power* The largest companies could
deal on equal terms with their employees throughout the nation but the
smaller coiiq>anles were practically at the mercy of the labor-union
bosses* Whatever they had insisted upon, the employers practically
had to give to them* Many strikes had been brought about by unreasonable
labor demands to which the employer finally felt he cou]^ not possibly
yield and, at the same time, maintain the Integrity and Independence
of his business*
In general, the law was a reasonable one. If there were to be
37
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free collective bargaining in industry it must be between responsible
parties. S(^ of the provisions of the law dealt with the question
of greater responsibility on the part of the unions as well as manage¬
ment.
Labor leaders were not concerned over the specific provisions of
the lawj they were against any legislation that^ would« in any way,
reduce the power of the labor unions. On the other hand, the President
had never publicly recognized that there were labor union abuses.
There was nothing in his veto message really recognizing that there were
abuses, except a little lip service. His message mentioned elimination
of jurisdictional strikes and secondary boycotts but there was never
any real recommendation from him to take care of these problems.
So Congress forced the problem of either producing a constructive
labor measure, saying to the labor-union leaders, "no, there is no
Congress of the United States, there is no President of the United
States, who dares to stand up against your power."
In the Taft-Hartley law, the government has changed the situa¬
tion so that the law recognizes that there are unfair labor practices
on the part of employees, just as the Wagner bill had recognized that
there were unfair labor practices on the part of employers, in its
provisions. They tried to abolish the special privileges conferred by
pre-existing legislation and they have based this measure of freedom
on contract and (xt free collective bargaining.
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